

## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

## BACKGROUND: Events in the Congo Since 1 April 1961

In the last month, Tshombe, under pressure from the UN, the Leopoldville government, and factions within his own regime, lost the initiative he gained at Tananarive last March; he ultimately was put in detention by Leopoldville officials. He maintained his pre-eminent position until about mid-April; at that time, however, he was thwarted on several fronts. Beginning about 10 April, the UN command moved to blunt the Katanga government's offensive against Baluba tribesmen in the northern part of the province. UN contingents in the area were reinforced--they now number about 2000--and the UN captured about half--some thirty--of the "white legion" which had been spearheading the Katanga attacks. The legionnaires, most of them South Africans, have been repatriated, and Katanga military operations have been ineffective since then.

This military rebuff weakened Tshombe's position in Elisabethville, and soon the tribalist-dominated legislature proposed that a prime minister be appointed, with Tshombe relegated to ceremonial presidential duties. This was followed on 17 April by an agreement between Kasavubu and the UN which, inter alia, reasserted the central government's claim to hegemony over Tshombe and his Belgian advisors.

These checks reportedly enraged Tshombe; however, he seems to have underestimated the amount of animosity harbored for him in Leopoldville. He went to the Coquilhatville conference apparently assuming that his role would be that of a dictator of terms, as it had been at Tananarive. However, the Leopoldville delegation, led by Foreign Minister Bomboko and backed up by its recent agreement with the UN, took a much stiffer attitude and refused Tshombe's demand that the UN agreement be repudiated and Katanga's virtual independence recognized. Tshombe then tried to leave Coquilhatville, and it was at this point that he was put under detention. This seems to have been ordered by at least some of the Leopoldville delegates; at any rate, it is fairly clear that for some time Tshombe will not be active in Congolese politics except on Leopoldville's terms.

The situation in Katanga following Tshombe's detention remains unclear. Extensive opposition to both Tshombe and the

Belgians has been reported, but so far the scene has been quiet. Interior Minister Munongo, a conservative tribalist who was the likeliest candidate for the prime ministership under the revisions proposed by the legislature, has given no indication that he intends to take over. Katanga affairs are now being run by a triumvirate made up of Munongo, Vice-President Kibwe, and National Assembly President Mutaka, and it seems unlikely that any Katanga figure will attain the degree of personal rule heretofore enjoyed by Tshombe.

Tshombe's lieutenants have been somewhat more conciliatory toward the UN than were Tshombe and his advisors. On 2 May they announced that they were willing to discuss with the UN the implementation of the 21 February Security Council resolution. Simultaneously, however, they stated that Tshombe must be released, and their initial disposition to cooperate with the UN may be reversed if, as seems likely, the UN makes no effort to intervene on his behalf.

In addition to exerting pressure on Katanga, the Leopoldville government apparently is maintaining some kind of contact with Gizenga's regime in Stanleyville. Early in April preliminary negotiations with Gizenga were conducted by Leopoldville Provincial President Kamitatu, who is a member of Gizenga's party but has been cooperating to some extent with the Kasavubu regime. Kamitatu gave an optimistic estimate of the possibility of a reconciliation between Leopoldville and Stanleyville; no further contacts between civil officials took place, however, apparently as a result of mutual distrust.

Discussions between military representatives of Leopoldville and Stanleyville seem to have been somewhat more fruitful. There have been persistent reports that the Orientale military, possibly including its chief, General Lundula, has been more disposed toward a reconciliation than have its civilian superiors. Several contacts which reportedly resulted in an agreement between Mobutu's and Lundula's representatives have taken place in northern Equateur Province, and a military delegation from Stanleyville attended part of the Coquilhatville conference. Stanleyville and Leopoldville both seem eager for a reconciliation but are unwilling to make the necessary concessions; military elements, who fear the army would be weakened either by a fragmentation of the Congo or by a weak confederal structure, may be able to exert pressure for reunification on the basis of a more highly centralized constitution.


In Stanleyville, Gizenga's regime reportedly increased in stability during the month. Lundula, who has reestablished tenuous control over his troops in the area around the city,

apparently still accepts Gizenga as the head of the government and echoes his line that the reconvening of parliament is a prerequisite for a reconciliation with Leopoldville. There is a powerful radical faction headed by Interior Minister Gbenye, considered to be a dangerous racist, but it has not challenged Gizenga's primacy. The Gizenga "central government" is on bad terms with the moderate Orientale Provincial regime headed by Jean Foster Manzikala, which regards Gizenga's group as interlopers; however, Manzikala lacks the backing to engage in a test of strength with Gizenga.

The economic situation in Stanleyville continues to deteriorate, partly as a result of the failure of Gizenga's bloc and Afro-Asian supporters to furnish material assistance in any quantity. 25X1



The supply of arms to Gizenga from his supporters in the bloc and Africa remains a possibility, however. At least one shipload of small arms from the USSR recently arrived in Ghana, 25X1



Nkrumah probably is extremely reluctant to dissociate himself from the UN operation; however, the recent slaughter of Ghanaian UN troops in Port Franqui will make it more difficult for him to resist internal and external pressure to take a harder line in support of Gizenga and thus to move away from the nominal neutrality he has so far maintained.

UN policy in recent weeks has been to work with Leopoldville, oppose Elisabethville, and largely to ignore Stanleyville. UN relations with the Kasavubu government have steadily improved from a low point following the Matadi incident in early March. By a mixture of threats and cajolery, Hammarskjold has secured Kasavubu's agreement to the presence of a small Nigerian police force in Matadi. This agreement could still be upset either by popular opposition or by continued intransigence on the part of Mobutu, but none of the parties seems willing to make a major issue out of the dispute at present.

The rapport between Leopoldville and the UN could also be upset by the return of Rajeshwar Dayal to Leopoldville as Hammarskjold's representative. Hammarskjold has implied that his agreements with Kasavubu give him some leeway in his plans for Dayal; his latest plan is to send Dayal back for a brief stay and then to replace him with a five-man commission. Congolese in Leopoldville have threatened new outbreaks if Dayal should return even for a short period;

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The UN has secured Kasavubu's cooperation in a strong stand against Katanga, and it apparently is continuing its efforts to limit the activities of Elisabethville troops in northern Katanga. Hammarskjold is maintaining a 3200-man contingent of Indian troops, who apparently are feared and disliked by almost all Congolese, as a reserve force on the UN base at Kamina. Joint pressure is being maintained by Leopoldville and the UN to remove key Belgian advisors in Katanga, four of whom were taken with Tshombe in Coquilhatville and were turned over to the UN.

Belgium's attitude toward the UN and the Congo has been modified by the incoming Spaak-Lefevre government in Brussels. Spaak is known to believe that Belgium has been too strong in its support of Tshombe and has ignored the Leopoldville regime. He has been more cooperative than his predecessor in the foreign ministry in negotiations with the UN, and he reportedly plans to bring the African affairs ministry

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under the control of his ministry. Spaak may be able to change Belgium's policy to some degree; however, Belgian public opinion and the country's financial interests will make difficult a policy of complete cooperation with the UN or abandonment of Katanga.

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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